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 1. The EUREGIO  
 
With a history dating back to the 1950s, the EUREGIO is among the oldest Euroregions 
in Europe. It can be considered as a successful case of a cross-border region (CBR) in 
the sense that it has firmly established itself as a border agency within its stretch of the 
Dutch-German border area. The EUREGIO has also been one of the main protagonists 
behind the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) that over the last decades 
acted to spread the Euroregion model across the European territory.  
 This chapter has several objectives. Firstly, it introduces the case of the 
EUREGIO and presents evidence on its history, organisational set-up and policies.1 
Secondly, it analyses the context conditions under which the EUREGIO emerged and 
the governance structures that were created as a result. Particular emphasis is put on the 
position and role of the EUREGIO within the wider context of the European multi-level 
governance framework generated by EU cohesion policy. The chapter concludes with 
an attempt to evaluate the success and impact of the EUREGIO and a discussion of the 
challenges related to the EUREGIO’s dual role as representative of local authority 
interests and EU cohesion policy implementation agency.  
 
2. A Short History of the EUREGIO  
 
The origins of the EUREGIO date back to 1958 when local authorities on both sides of 
the Dutch-German border organised the first cross-border conference.2 This event had 
been preceded by attempts of neighbouring local authorities to collaborate. An inter-
municipal association on the German side, the “Interessensgemeinschaft Rhein-Ems” 
                                                 
1 The empirical evidence on the EUREGIO is derived from the author’s fieldwork (involving 21 formal 
interviews carried out between 1998-2005), extensive policy documentation as well as the secondary 
literature. The latter includes primarily the work of Schack (1998), and additionally, Aykaç (1994); 
Denters, Schobben and van der Veen (1998); Murphy (1993); Goinga (1995); Heineberg and Temlitz 
(1998); IRS (1994), Bergerat (2002).   
2 A common organisational body was only established in 1965 when the “EUREGIO” label was taken 
from the denomination of an exhibition.  
had been founded in 1954 by local politicians of the Westmünsterland and the 
Grafschaft Bentheim and Lingen Kreise. Among its objectives were to address the 
restructuring problems in the textile sector and improve the local and regional 
infrastructures. In 1962, the more informal Interessensgemeinschaft was replaced by the 
“Kommunalgemeinschaft Weser-Ems”, a public law inter-municipal body. A similar 
process of intermunicipal integration occurred in the adjoining Dutch border area where 
the municipalities in the areas of Twente and Gelderland founded the an association3 
with the explicit objective of co-operating more closely with the 
Interessensgemeinschaft Rhein-Ems (later Kommunalgemeinschaft Rhein-Ems). This 
example was followed by a second association, the Samenwerkningsverband Oost-
Gelderland (today Regio Achterhoek). Today, the Kommunalgemeinschaft Rhein-Ems, 
the Regio Twente and the Regio Achterhoek together form the EUREGIO.  
 These inter-municipal bodies subsequently became the major agents driving 
cross-border co-operation and the formation of the EUREGIO. The emerging 
organisation was mainly pre-occupied with pressing issues such as economic 
marginalisation and substandard infrastructure. In order to animate these fledgling 
cross-border coalitions, the partners mobilised resources via a variety of channels, 
initially by approaching higher level authorities such as the German state authorities, 
central governments and supranational agencies that were emerging at this time in 
Europe.  
 In this way, by pooling the political weight of several German districts (Kreise), 
together with the corresponding entities (regios) on the Dutch side, it was hoped to give 
the area a stronger representation within higher-level government. As one participant 
recalls: “we mobilised all the MPs [member of parliament] of this area and got them to 
pursue the interests of this area in transport policy, education policy etc; sometimes, we 
sent off twelve of them [to central government departments]”. For instance, they lobbied 
successfully for the westward diversion of the A1 motorway and the construction of 
another motorway. 
 The EUREGIO “Work Group” (today: Board) was founded in 1966 to operate as 
the informal board of the cross-border region. On the basis of regular meetings, it 
                                                 
3 Belangengemeemschap Twente-Gelderland, later Samenwerkningsverband Twente, today Regio 
Twente.  
attempted to shift the EUREGIO’s work from purely project-based contacts towards a 
programmatic collaboration. An important event was the establishment of the Alfred 
Mozer Commission in 1970, a body responsible for cross-border initiatives in the 
cultural field. At the same time, a secretariat was established comprising two units on 
each side of the border and funded by membership fees. Two studies, in the fields of 
culture and economic affairs respectively, gave the secretariats a programmatic basis for 
the further development of the EUREGIO.  
 In the mid-seventies, the Work Group was given a formal basis by means of a 
statute (Satzung), and a common action programme was developed. This 
institutionalisation process culminated in the EUREGIO Council in 1978, the first 
cross-border regional parliamentary assembly in Europe constituted by the political 
delegates of the member authorities.  
 In 1985, the separate secretariats were merged into a single secretariat, located in 
the border town of Gronau (DE), employing both Dutch and German staff. On the 
programmatic side, a “regional cross-border action programme” was presented in 1987, 
outlining the general strategy for the EUREGIO for a twenty year period (NEI nd). The 
programme had been initiated via an agreement in 1984 between the German Federal 
ministry of economics, the Dutch ministry of economics and the Länder NRW and 
Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen). Funding 
was also provided by the European 
Commission. A Steering Committee was 
established, involving the partners in this 
agreement as well as the provinces, 
districts (Bezirksregierungen) and the 
EUREGIO. The action programme 
contained an economic and social analysis 
of the programme areas, and listed a series 
of measures aimed at promoting their 
socio-economic development.    
Figure 1: Location of the EUREGIO  This action programme constituted the 
main input for the first Operational Programme for the period 1989-1992, funded as 
pilot project under art. 10 ERDF.4 When the European Commission in 1990 launched a 
specific programme to promote cross-border co-operation, INTERREG I, the 
EUREGIO reacted with the speedy elaboration of a new Operational Programme based 
on its accumulated experience. With the advent of INTERREG II (1994-1999) and 
INTERREG III (2001-2008), the EUREGIO had established itself as strong candidate 
for dealing with all cross-border co-operation (CBC) matters in the area.  
 
EUREGIO: socio-economic profile  
Among the four Dutch-German CBRs, the EUREGIO is situated in between the “Ems Dollart Region” in 
the north, and the “Euregio Rhein-Waal” and the “euregio rhein-maas-nord” in the south. It includes part 
of the Gelderland, Overijessel and Drenthe provinces on the Dutch side, and parts of the Länder North-
Rhine Westphalia and Lower Saxony on the German side. Stretched over 13,000 km2, the EUREGIO area 
has a population of approx. 3.2m. The largest urban centres are Enschede (NL), Münster and Osnabrück 
(D).  
The EUREGIO is an old industrial area within a rural setting that formerly specialised in the textile 
sector. In previous centuries, the populations on both sides of the borders spoke the same language, a 
Saxon-lower German dialect. The mainly cotton-based industry emerged out of home-based textile 
production in the second half of the 19th century, and developed into the main industrial base of areas on 
both sides of the border. Although the border has remained unchanged since 1648, its impact on the 
economic structure was increasingly felt only in this century. Until the end of the 19th century, the area 
had been characterised by strong functional interdependencies induced by the common industrial 
structure along the so-called “cotton road”. While in 1960, 21% of the labour force still worked in the 
textiles sector, today the share has declined to a marginal 4%. Given this situation of industrial decline, 
parts of the EUREGIO are classified as Objective-2 areas by the European Commisssion, and most rural 
areas are classified as Objective-5b areas. The unemployment rate in the area has been consistently above 
the respective national average; similarly, both the GDP per capita and the value added per employed 
person are still below average. 
 
3. Conditions of Emergence: the institutional context  
 
The emergence of the EUREGIO rests upon a series of context conditions on the 
European and national levels. The opportunities provided by the EU (Interreg) apply to 
                                                 
4 European Regional Development Fund, the major component of EU cohesion policy.  
all border areas within the EU and are not specific to the EUREGIO. This means the 
existence of a European-wide policy to promote CBC cannot explain why there is a 
concentration of advanced cases in some European areas, such as the German-Dutch 
border, while in others, such as much of Southern Europe, CBC initiatives are less 
developed.  
 Most early Euroregions originated on the western German border, with a 
particular concentration on the Dutch-German border, and mostly in North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW). This suggests that some particular context conditions prevailed in 
this geographical area, providing a favourable ground for CBC initiatives. 
 In the following, two points are made to elucidate these context conditions that 
apply to these CBC initiatives, and the EUREGIO in particular. The first point is related 
to the attitude of higher-level public authorities (and implicitly their administrative 
culture) towards the devolution of cross-border policy matters to the local level. The 
second point concerns the impact of the administrative systems prevailing in different 
countries on the possibility of emerging CBC initiatives.  
 Relating to the first issue, in the case of the EUREGIO, both the Dutch central 
government and the NRW Land government traditionally adopted a “CBC friendly” 
attitude towards their border municipalities. This is demonstrated by initiatives and 
funding opportunities the NRW government provided to border authorities in the areas 
of spatial planning, socio-cultural policy and economic policy from the 1960s onwards. 
For instance, in 1970 contacts between German federal ministry of home affairs, NRW 
and the Dutch ministry of Culture culminated in he “Anholt agreements” where the 
participants declared their intention to support projects ‘aimed at overcoming the 
border’ (Bauer, 1985). The Mozer Commission was established, involving the 
ministries mentioned, the provinces Overijssel and Gelderland as well as the German 
and Dutch embassies. In 1978, NRW increased its financial contribution to the Mozer 
Commission when the federal government stopped its payments. Support was provided 
both for cross-border organisations 
(‘institutional support’) as well as for single 
projects.  
 
 
Figure 2: Map of the EUREGIO 
Similarly, in the field of regional policy, 
NRW funds were made available for the 
elaboration of so-called “regional cross-border action programmes” (Malchus, 1985a: 
14-5). The idea of designing such regional development programmes originated in 1976 
during the biannual meetings on regional policy between the German and Dutch 
economics ministries, and the economics ministries of the Länder NRW and Lower 
Saxony that had been held regularly since 1965 (Becker, 1985: 54). They were also 
thought to be a conceptual starting point for possible ERDF support measures as the 
fund had been launched in 1975 ( Malchus, 1985a: 15).  
 Such measures originated from within an administrative culture in NRW that 
promoted the decentralisation and delegation of policy implementation to the regional 
and local levels. The “Ruhr”, NRW’s old industrial area dominated by the coal mining 
and steel sectors, was the first target for such regionally conceived development plans as 
early as in the late sixties. More recently, such initiatives aimed at the “regionalisation 
of structural policy” were launched under the headers of “regional conferences” or 
“future initiatives” (Voelzkow, 1995: 9). In this sense, the EUREGIO collaboration is 
just a special case of many other types of such local and regional initiatives aimed at 
improving economic opportunities for defined areas. 
 On the second point, the impact of administrative systems, it is worth noting that 
cross-border co-operation along the template developed by the EUREGIO appears to be 
a predominantly German phenomenon. Many advanced cross-border regions (CBRs) 
with a strong role of local government involve German participation. How can this be 
explained? To a large degree, this is due to the strong position of the local level in 
German public administration, but also the fact that the institutional template of the 
CBR was “invented” in Germany and enjoys a considerable legitimacy within the 
federalist German system. This is reflected in the fact that co-operation has been in most 
cases chronologically preceded or at least accompanied by inter-state co-operation 
arrangements, such as the intergovernmental commissions.  
 The institutional factors explaining the predominance of German CBRs with 
local participation, such as notably the EUREGIO, can be summarised as follows. Of 
foremost importance is the administrative-institutional context in which the CBRs 
operate. In the German system, the two-level structure of local authorities – consisting 
of the municipalities on the one hand and district-type aggregations of municipalities 
(Kreise) on the other – facilitates collective action among municipalities. This allows 
the local authorities to collectively engage in strategies that are aimed at enhancing both 
their resource position and representation vis-à-vis the higher-level authorities. Similar 
conditions prevail in Scandinavia where a number of more advanced CBC cases can be 
found. Municipalities enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy in the Nordic countries 
and their policy repertoire has long included inter-municipal co-operation (Bergmann-
Winberg, 1998).  
 The dividing line between, on the one hand, Germany and Scandinavia, and 
countries such as Italy and France, on the other, reflects a typology of local government 
proposed by Page and Goldsmith (1987). Northern European local government has 
higher margins of discretion and a broader set of responsibilities, backed up by locally 
raised resources, compared to Southern European local governments’ lower levels of 
discretion and responsibilities. It appears that these institutional differences are partly 
responsible for the ability of local actors to group together and form strategic coalitions 
across borders.  
 Put simply, CBC is more likely to be effective in countries with a strong 
tradition of municipal autonomy. This is re-enforced by a benevolent attitude of higher-
level authorities such as districts or regions towards inter-municipal co-operation in 
general and CBC in particular. One of the deeper reasons behind this is that communal 
co-operation, even across borders, is often seen as politically unproblematic while co-
operation pursued by larger regional authorities is more likely to be politically charged 
and therefore resisted by central state authorities. An example of such a situation is 
provided by the case of the Tirol Euroregion, a CBR involving the Austrian Land Tirol 
and the Italian provinces of South Tyrol and Trentino (Perkmann, 2005a). The 
formation of the Euroregion has long been hindered by Italian central state authorities 
fearing that intensified co-operation would provide unwelcome political capital to the 
German-speaking political elite in South Tyrol, thereby possibly re-enforcing separatist 
or autonomist tendencies. In Eastern Europe too, central state authorities have tended to 
keep tight control over EU-funded CBC initiatives with local and regional actors 
attempting to leverage co-operation to obtain more autonomy.  
 The lesson from these cases is that CBC is less likely to flourish in politically 
charged situations, for instance induced by “unjust borders” and divided ethnic 
minorities, as in the Tyrol case. By contrast, where suitable conditions for pragmatic co-
operation and strategy formation on the municipal level prevail, CBC is more likely to 
be promoted by central state authorities.  
 4. Organisational Structure and Policies  
  
The EUREGIO is a private-law association according to German law with approx. 130 
member local authorities from both German and the Netherlands at the time of writing. 
A statute defines the tasks and responsibilities transferred to the EUREGIO by the inter-
municipal associations and defines its bodies and their duties. This arrangement came 
into force in 1999 and replaced a more complex previous set-up according to which the 
EUREGIO was constituted via an agreement between three inter-municipal 
associations, the German Kommunalgemeinschaft Rhein-Ems and the Dutch regios 
Twente and Achterhoek. The current set-up reflects the failure in the 1990s to conceive 
a public-law bracket for the EUREGIO as previously envisaged by its decision-makers, 
due to fiscal problems related to Dutch personnel to be employed by a prospective 
public-law body EUREGIO (Bergerat, 2002).  
 The objective of the EUREGIO mandated by the statute is to promote, support 
and co-ordinate cross-border co-operation among its members. To this purpose, it is 
expected to initiate activities, design appropriate projects and raise funds. It also has 
been given an advisory function for citizens, organisations and authorities in cross-
border matters and acts as a cross-border broker between various types of organisations 
and authorities. Its substantial focus is broadly defined and includes a wide variety of 
policy fields, from economic development measures, infrastructure, to health and 
education to municipal services.  
 The EUREGIO bodies comprise the EUREGIO Council, the Board (Vorstand), a 
secretariat and a number of “working circles” (Arbeitskreise) in various policy fields.  
The EUREGIO-Council is a para-parliamentary body with no formal legislative 
competencies, and is constituted by 82 elected politicians appointed by the member 
authorities. In the Council, formally the most authoritative among the EUREGIO 
bodies, issues of general political importance are discussed. The Board is a supervisory 
board with approx. 20 members, and is composed of elected senior civil servants and 
political office-bearers of the member authorities. The “working circles”, which are 
flexibly composed by various expert civil servants from local and supralocal authorities 
and interest groups, deal with most of the project-oriented work in various policy fields, 
such as economic policy, social matters, the environment, culture and tourism, or “daily 
border problems”. In the cultural field, the “Mozer-Kommission”, named after a former 
EC director general, plays a special role among the several working circles and has its 
own budget, funded independently from INTERREG by various regional and national 
sources from both countries.  
 As this overview confirms, the EUREGIO is predominantly governed from 
within the public sector while private or third-sector organisations play no role in 
deciding over EUREGIO matters. However, a considerable number of the latter type of 
organisations, including SMEs, interest associations or education establishments, are 
among the bodies that receive INTERREG contributions for their activities.   
 The procedural details relating to INTERREG implementation are agreed 
between the partners via so-called ‘INTERREG agreements.5 The EUREGIO is given 
responsibility for  
• the general programme and financial management, including the elaboration of the 
Operational Programme,  
• the collection, evaluation and preliminary approval/rejection of project applications 
and their submission to the SC,   
• the co-ordination of the match-funds.  
 
 Project proposals are collected by the secretariat where a first preselection is 
made based on the basis of the EUREGIO’s own criteria, the general INTERREG 
requirements and the prevailing legislation for the territories of the member authorities. 
The EUREGIO criteria require all projects to have a genuine cross-border character in 
substantial, organisational, personal and financial respects. As the relevant agreement 
states, projects must relate to a “Euregional interest”, linked to a structural and socio-
economic significance for the region (EUREGIO and Rhein-Ems, 1996: 29).   
 The approved proposals are submitted to the Steering Committee (SC) which is 
the highest instance in INTERREGdecision-making. As with the other Euroregions on 
the Dutch-German border, for the EUREGIO a separate SC has been established. Apart 
                                                 
5 These agreements were concluded for each INTERREG period between the involved higher level Dutch 
authorities (central state and provinces), the German Länder and the four Dutch-German Euroregions.  
from the EUREGIO representatives, the Committee is composed of senior civil servants 
representing the following authorities: the Dutch ministry for Economics, and the 
provinces Drenthe, Overijssel and Gelderland on the Dutch side, and the Ministries of 
Economics of the German Länder NRW and Lower Saxony as well as the Münster and 
Weser-Ems districts on the German side. The EUREGIO proposes the president of the 
SC and runs its secretariat. The SC is responsible for final project approval and requires 
unanimous decision-making whereby each of the authorities mentioned has one vote. It 
also serves as the Monitoring Committee under EU regulations, involving the 
Commission and the German federal Ministry of Economics as additional members.  
 The INTERREG agreements significantly simplify the financial management. 
For its three Euroregions, the NRW Land administration has accepted the full and sole 
responsibility vis-à-vis the European Commission for the lawful implementation of the 
INTERREG OP on behalf of the Dutch central state and Lower Saxony. Its bank, the 
Investitionsbank Nordrhein-Westfalen (IB), manages the non-local EUREGIO 
INTERREG funds. All EU and national match-funds, the Dutch contributions included, 
are paid into a single account. This simplifies the INTERREG-related procedures by 
allowing the INTERREG subsidies to be paid to the project leaders in a single 
assignment. The IB concludes private law contracts with the project leaders specifying 
the details realising the projects, replacing up to eight public law assignments from up 
to eight different authorities. The IB also audits the funds on behalf of all interested 
parties. To simplify the programme implementation within its own administrative 
realm, the NRW has established a single INTERREG budget comprehending all match-
funds from different ministries. Due to these streamlined procedures, projects are in 
general approved within three to six months (Deloitte and Touche, 1998: 22).  
 As for the substantive content for the INTERREG measures, the INTERREG 
agreements generally define six policy priority areas. Within this general framework, 
the EUREGIO autonomously determine the priorities within its own Operational 
Programme. For the period 2001-2008, it controls approx. EUR 49m INTERREG-
related funds which are complemented by national, regional and local funds to form a 
total budget of EUR 111m. This amounts to an annual expenditure of approx. EUR 4.3 
per capita. The largest share of the funds is dedicated to the areas of economic policy, in 
particular technology and innovation policy.   
 Compared to earlier INTERREG programmes, the share of means dedicated to 
technology and innovation policy has been significantly increased. This reflects the 
attempts by the European Commission and the member states to streamline the 
INTERREG programme in line with the Lisbon Agenda to make the European Union 
economies more competitive. The Lisbon Agenda defines technology and innovation 
policies as one of the pillars of long-term competitiveness policies.  
 As a result of this focus on the knowledge economy, a number of universities 
and other higher education establishments as well as research centres are among the 
recipients of INTERREG funding. During the INTERREG II period, universities and 
other higher education organisations accounted for a total of 28% of the total EU 
expenditure spent on 12 projects; this share will presumably be higher for the 
INTERREG III period. Examples of activities pursued in this area include a project to 
establish a biotechnology support network, run jointly by the Universities of Münster 
and Groningen at a total cost of approx EUR 7.3m.  
 
 
 
Table 1: EUREGIO INTERREG III: financial summary 
 EUR m 
Economic policy, technology and innovation 24.5 
Labour market and vocational training 8.0 
Social networks, border problems, culture, education 6.4 
Spatial structure 4.6 
Environment, nature and agriculture 1.7 
Technical assistance 3.3 
Total 48.7 
Figures indicate EU contributions only (Source: EUREGIO). 
 
 In addition to the INTERREG-funded activities, the EUREGIO has attracted 
funds from other EU and national sources. For instance, the secretariat successfully bid 
for pilot-projects from various Directorate Generals of the European Commission in the 
late 1990s. The EUREGIO is currently in charge of a “EURES-T” unit concerned with 
the facilitation of cross-border market flows, funded by Directorate General 5 and a 
European Consumer Advice Centre, part of a network of centres across Europe. For 
some time, it also ran a ‘Euro-Info-Center’ for SMEs as part of a network of more than 
200 centres throughout the EU.  
 By diversifying its portfolio of activities and funding sources, the EUREGIO 
organisation sought to avoid overdependence on INTERREG although this programme 
and related match-funding still constitute four fifths of overall income and has more 
recently increased. Nevertheless, the secretariat today operates a range of activities that 
strengthen its profile as cross-border regional advice and citizen’s service centre. For 
instance, including the contacts in the context of the various European pilot projects 
mentioned above, the secretariat is contacted by approx. 20,000 citizens a year. The 
EUREGIO also runs secretariats for a range of third bodies and associations, as, for 
instance, for the INTERREG Steering and Monitoring Committees, the Mozer-
Kommission, a social-economic advisory body involving trade unions and business 
associations, the “Arnhem-Overleg”6 as well as for the Association of European Border 
Regions.  
 
 
5. Decision-making and implementation structures: the 
governance of the EUREGIO 
 
Cross-border regions represent a specific challenge within public sector governance due 
their atypical, non-nested territorial set-up: As their constituent parts – municipalities, 
districts and other subnational jurisdictions – belong to different nation states, they do 
not operate in a conventional context of public administration defined by legal 
competencies and decision-making mechanisms rooted in public law. Though they 
might be interpreted as incipient new “scales” of territorial organisation (Perkmann, 
2006), CBRs do not have “governments” but rely on voluntary co-operation within a 
context of pragmatically defined and mutually recognised set of rules. For a long time, 
                                                 
6 The Arnhem-Overleg is a forum of all Belgian-Dutch-German Euroregions. 
they have operated outside public law and resorted to civil law arrangements (Beyerlin, 
1998) and in view of the difficulties this is not expected to change. They can therefore 
be seen as exemplary for a type of public agency that has been described as 
“governance” by authors in regional and urban studies, political science and 
organisational studies (Jessop, 1998; Le Galès, 1998). In various forms, the principle of 
governance – often contrasted to government – has widely been connected to the 
operation of networks among parties willing to co-operate in the absence of a 
hierarchical instance (Messner, 1997; Hanf and O’Toole, 1992).  
 For these reasons, the EUREGIO’s decision-making processes are more 
complex than suggested by its organisational set-up. As an organisation, the EUREGIO 
operates within a context of network relationships both on the local and supralocal level 
that is typical for many European CBRs. These two network realms can be characterised 
as “horizontal” and “vertical” networks, respectively. While the horizontal network 
concerns the collaboration and co-ordination with the local member authorities and 
project grant holders, the vertical network is related to the governance and monitoring 
of INTERREG implementation where higher level authorities (i.e. federal government, 
regional government) and the European Commission play an important role.  
 In the EUREGIO, networked governance can therefore be discussed in relation 
to three levels: (a) the EUREGIO secretariat; (b) a horizontal border-crossing network 
of local authorities; (c) a vertical, “multi-level” network of authorities including local, 
regional, Land, central state and EU actors.   
 
5.1 The EUREGIO as organisation 
From an organisational viewpoint, the nodal point of the EUREGIO is the secretariat, 
which over the last forty years has developed into an organisation with a high degree of 
specialist competence. The secretariat has no constitutionally instituted competencies 
nor does it have any guaranteed income streams. At the same time, its mandate is 
relatively undefined. This enables the secretariat to act in an entrepreneurial fashion as 
long as it has the backing of the member authorities. This relative discretion in defining 
and expanding its tasks has been widely used by the EUREGIO secretariat.  
 This is reflected in its success in generating a stable resource flow to maintain its 
operations. Unlike other Euroregions, the secretariat always sought to avoid 
overdependence on the mostly temporary resources provided by non-local authorities. 
As a result, the EUREGIO disposes over a considerable income from sources not 
related to Interreg, notably from a membership fee charged to the member authorities, 
approx. EUR .30 per inhabitant in 2005. The proceeds from the membership fee enable 
the EUREGIO to pay its overheads out of its own budget. The secretariat proved 
successful in raising project-related funding long before INTERREG was launched. In 
most cases, local funds were complemented by contributions from NRW and the 
European Commission. As mentioned above, more recently, the secretariat also 
successfully bid for pilot-projects from various DGs of the European Commission. As a 
result, today the secretariat operates a range of activities that strengthen its profile as 
cross-border regional advice and citizen’s service centre.  
 The development of a strong organisational basis – enabled by a steadily 
increasing resource flow – was crucial for providing the local actors with access to 
INTERREG implementation. In the 1980s, the member municipalities agreed to 
increase their financial contribution in the expectation that this would help to secure a 
substantial local impact on the allocation of future European funding. The EUREGIO 
grasped a strategic opportunity when it was still undecided whether a large-scale CBC 
support programme would be launched.  
 The result was that when INTERREG was finally launched, with 15 staff 
members the EUREGIO secretariat was the natural candidate for programme 
management.7 It had positioned itself as the strategy unit responsible for a range of 
tasks no other organisation could deal with, becoming the undisputed agency for 
“mobilising the region”.  
 Based on its expertise and local connectedness, the secretariat exerts 
considerable informal influence upon EU programme implementation, for several 
reasons: First, by acting as a project animator, it ensures that all available funds are 
effectively allocated. Secondly, it has made itself indispensable as a network broker. For 
genuine cross-border projects, project applicants need partners on the other side of the 
border; the relevant contacts are usually established by the secretariat. Thirdly, the 
                                                 
7 ‘… the EUREGIO was already there, it was obvious that they were going to do the programme 
management.’ (Senior local authority official).  
secretariat uses its administrative expertise to turn initial ideas into project applications 
ready for submission to the INTERREG Steering Committee.  
 Concluding, the role of the secretariat doubles as both a network broker, 
securing ongoing co-operation among the members of the network, and a policy 
entrepreneur, continuously seeking to introduce policy innovations to widen the role 
and impact of the EUREGIO (Mintrom, 1997; Roberts and King, 1996; Christopoulous, 
2001). (It developed the EUREGIO from a loose network with strong ceremonial 
elements into a regional policy agency that has assumed the self-defined mandate of 
transforming the cross-border region into a “central location in North-western Europe” 
with 20m consumers within 150km (Gabbe, 1985: 95). The secretariat has assumed the 
role of a “functional government” (Beck, 1997) not on the basis of a strong formal 
mandate but through a skilful moderation and solidification of the horizontal and 
vertical policy network structures the EUREGIO is embedded in. These are discussed in 
the following.  
 
5.2 The local network  
Though common rules and obligations have been defined via formalised agreements, as 
a non-mandatory body, the EUREGIO relies on voluntary co-operation among local 
authorities. This is co-ordinated via a number of networks across the member 
authorities, some of which have visible, formalised front-ends. The most important 
among these is the EUREGIO Board that acts as a supervisory committee and involves 
senior civil servants and political office-bearers from the most powerful and active 
member authorities on both sides of the border. In addition, a number of “Working 
Circles” exist, specialising in single policy areas and involving expert civil servants 
from local and supralocal authorities and interest groups. They deal with project-
oriented work in various policy fields, such as economic policy, social matters, or “daily 
border problems”. 
 The most important feature of these relationships is their technocratic nature as 
the main work load is carried by the expert civil servants. Such technocratic networks 
are usually more stable than purely “topocratic” networks composed of politicians and 
tend to be committed to problem-solving as opposed to pure bargaining (Rhodes, 1990; 
Benz, 1995). This is despite the fact that strategic EUREGIO matters are usually dealt 
with personally by the top officials who act more like political generalists and hence 
‘topocrats’ representing their constituency.  
 Decision-making and co-ordination even in technocratic networks can be 
notoriously difficult, especially when it comes to issues of distribution or even re-
distribution (Beck, 1997). In the EUREGIO, conflicts could for instance arise over the 
geographical distribution of project funding or decisions favouring larger authorities 
over smaller ones, or urban municipalities over rural ones.  
 The EUREGIO developed a variety of mechanisms to reduce the conflictuality 
and complexity of decision-making within the local cross-border networks. With the 
secretariat playing an active part as a network broker, the EUREGIO developed a set of 
norms that maintain a usually productive problem-solving climate, for instance a 
commitment to the “long-term” and a sense of distributional fairness. A balanced 
distribution of project funding over time (to mitigate limited resources) and across space 
(to secure commitment) is seen as crucial for unifying particularist interests behind a 
common objective. There is no explicit or implicit formula for distributing Interreg-
support between the two countries or between different constituencies. The secretariat 
enjoys a strong reputation for allocating funds even-handedly. This is why decision-
making on projects is usually non-conflictual and smaller municipalities are 
discouraged from defecting. A further factor in reducing the complexity of decision-
making in networks is a relatively small number of participants (Messner, 1997). In this 
respect, the municipal associations in the EUREGIO network play a key role by 
restricting the number of (relevant) participants, while representing the smaller 
members. At the same time, they are important in securing the commitment of the 
participating municipalities, even by sometimes paying for their membership. All these 
structural and processual features of the EUREGIO taken together ensure the relative 
stability and coherence of this networked governance arrangement over time.   
 
5.3 The vertical network  
The vertical, multi-level network involving regional, national and European policy 
agencies in EUREGIO activities constitute an example of an EU cohesion policy 
implementation network (Heinelt and Smith, 1996). The supralocal network linkages 
provide access to a significant amount of resources, complementing the local resources 
which are complementary at best. These relationships were established long before the 
EUREGIO was given its mandate in INTERREG implementation. Its early successes all 
crucially depended on the support of non-local authorities, in particular the Land NRW, 
the Dutch government and the European Commission. 
 As mentioned, the Dutch central government and North Rhine-Westphalia have 
traditionally adopted a “CBC-friendly” attitude towards their border municipalities. The 
European Commission had also joined the vertical network as an important catalyst and 
player as early as in the 1970s, long before INTERREG was launched. In the 1990s, the 
loose network relationships were consolidated into the INTERREG Steering 
Committee.  
 As a result of these developments, the EUREGIO has become an important 
implementation partner for the European Commission. Due to its expertise and 
authority in the local context, it enjoys a status that goes beyond its formal position in 
the vertical network. The EUREGIO is a full member of the Steering Committee and is 
entitled to propose its chairman. Formally, the Steering Committee is the ultimate 
instance in the decision-making process on the allocation of INTERREG funds. 
Practically speaking, however, decisions are rarely imposed on the EUREGIO actors, 
effectively valuing the professionalism of the secretariat. The interview evidence points 
to high-trust relationships across the vertical networks, often constituted by long-term 
working relationships among individuals and high ideological commitment to the CBC 
cause.  
 But, apart from such motives created by the social embeddedness of network 
contacts, for the Dutch and NRW authorities, there is also an administrative rationale 
for granting relative autonomy to the EUREGIO. A senior NRW official observed: “… 
you can’t pull projects like a rabbit out of a hat”. As the need to secure the cross-border 
character of INTERREG projects is taken seriously, the EUREGIO has a crucial role as 
a project animator to secure the successful allocation of INTERREG funds. The reliance 
on the EUREGIO is reflected by the fact that the NRW and Dutch ministries do not in 
general co-ordinate their positions on specific projects prior to SC meetings.  
 The involvement of the EUREGIO in this vertical network mirrors the general 
networked set-up of policy implementation in EU regional policy described as multi-
level governance (Hooghe, 1996; Benz and Eberlein, 1999). Given the importance of 
Interreg, the vertical network is also relevant for maintaining the stability of the local 
network described above. In fact, the local EUREGIO network operates in the “shadow 
of hierarchy” cast by the Steering Committee.8 To avoid rejection of project proposals 
by the Land or central government, the EUREGIO makes sure that projects have the 
structural economic impact required by the cohesion policy regulations. The relatively 
clear criteria for evaluating project proposals simplify the decision-making process by 
providing rules that can be routinely followed. In case of doubt, the uncertainty-
reducing function of these rules is complemented by the “shadow” of authority exerted 
by the Dutch and NRW governments as well as the European Commission that is 
channelled through the secretariat and can be used to discipline the members of the local 
network. Hence, the EUREGIO secretariat performs an interface function by mediating 
between the network of EUREGIO members and the supranational network crystallised 
in the Steering Committee. On one hand, the supranational authorities trust in the 
secretariat’s administrative expertise and its ability to prioritise the “objective” quality 
of projects over the particularist interests of project applicants. On the other, the local 
authorities perceive the secretariat as their agent and representative vis-à-vis the higher-
level authorities. It can be followed from the high level of interdependence between the 
local network and the vertical network relationships that the EUREGIO is highly 
dependent on its integration into the supranational policy framework provided by the 
EU.  
 Concluding, the described three-tiered governance structure developed by the 
EUREGIO provides an arrangement for co-ordinating public agency across national 
borders that is effective as it can be under the existing administrative and legal 
limitations.  
 
 
6. Conclusion and evaluation  
 
The EUREGIO is a cross-border region driven by local authorities and co-ordinated by 
a relatively independent and resourceful secretariat. This arrangement has proved a 
success recipe for organisational and policy growth over the last decades. In this 
concluding section, I address three questions that are of interest for the overall 
                                                 
8 On co-ordination in the “shadow of hierarchy”, cf. Scharpf (1996).  
evaluation of the EUREGIO and European CBC in general. First, how should we judge 
the success or otherwise of Euroregions, and the EUREGIO specifically? I propose a 
number of criteria that can be used for assessing the relative success of CBC initiatives. 
Second, has the EUREGIO, and the Euroregions in general, generated innovative forms 
of governance? In this respect, the EUREGIO has indeed had a major impact on the 
creation of the Euroregion model as a whole; however, to a large extent, this process 
was also strongly shaped by EU cohesion policy that provided opportunities for the 
emergence of agencies such as the EUREGIO. Third, what can be said about the impact 
of the EUREGIO on stimulating local cross-border integration? This question will be 
addressed with respect to the overall difficulty of assessing CBC impact.  
 On the first question, if one compares different Euroregions that exist across the 
European continent, one finds considerable variation (Perkmann, 2003). For many, 
INTERREG is by far the most important source of funding, raising the question whether 
these initiatives only exist because this type of resource is available to them. In that 
case, they would qualify as hardly more than “grant coalitions” (Cochrane, Peck and 
Tickell, 1996) that disintegrate once the funding stream runs out. Judging from the 
evidence this might be the case for some but certainly not for all CBRs in Europe. 
Observers have also pointed out that a certain degree of “entrepreneurial” behaviour can 
actually indicate an effective empowerment of the regions against their central-state 
authorities within the context of EU integration (Smyrl, 1997). In this sense, therefore, 
their ability to mobilise funding could be interpreted as success.  
 There is a continuum between what can be called “permanent co-operation”, on 
the one hand, and “instrumental co-operation”, on the other, whereby the latter refers to 
co-operation arrangements that exist purely for the sake of taking advantage of 
INTERREG funds. Permanent co-operation, by contrast, would apply to Euroregions 
that have managed to avoid total dependence on Interreg. In view of the analysis 
pursued above, the EUREGIO would probably fall into the latter group. 
 In fact, the EUREGIO and other more developed cases can be seen as successful 
instances of policy entrepreneurship that managed to establish themselves as trusted 
implementation partner for the European Commission and central state authorities. 
Policy entrepreneurs are actors who initiate activities within specific policy areas by 
taking advantage of windows of opportunity opened up within their policy environment. 
They are in constant search for possible problems for which they can offer a solution 
(Kingdon, 1984; Mintrom and Vergari, 1996). They do this not necessarily for financial 
profit but to increase the influence of their organisation or organisational unit which is 
often correlated to their resource basis. There are several criteria that can be used for 
judging whether a policy entrepreneur (and by implication, a Euroregion) is successful 
or not. They can be summarised as follows:  
• Organisational development: In order to acquire a relative degree of strategic 
and operational autonomy vis-à-vis the “ordinary” border authorities, successful 
Euroregions will need to develop an independent organisation with a clear 
specialisation in CBR matters.  
• Diversification of resource base: Euroregions that depend on INTERREG 
funding risk being reduced to mere implementation agencies for this specific 
type of EU regional policy. Successful Euroregions can be expected to have 
more diversified and stable income streams, for instance via membership fees 
paid by participating authorities or the appropriation of other policy activities 
relevant for the border space. However, assuming that the availability of EU 
funding provides selective incentives (Olson, 1965) for municipalities to 
shoulder the cost of participation in return for INTERREG project funding – 
which could be indicative for purely ‘instrumental’ participation – it can be 
postulated that successful Euroregions will attempt to broaden their resource 
base to consider other, more diversified sources. 
• Appropriation of cross-border co-operation activities: Successful Euroregions 
will establish themselves as important players within the overall context of CBC 
activities in a given border area as there might be other organisations, such as 
civil society organisations, pursuing similar objectives. They will consequently 
play an important role in CBC strategising in their area of influence and be 
recognised as legitimate and competent by other public authorities. 
 
 Applying these criteria, the EUREGIO has to be judged as being among the 
more successful cases of CBC in Europe. It has developed a strong, independent base, a 
diversified stream of income (compared to other Euroregions) and a portfolio of various 
activities that go beyond the mere administration of INTERREG funding.  
 Has the Euroregion generated innovative forms of governance? The answer is 
that, on one hand, the EUREGIO must be seen as one of the pioneers driving the 
development of the Euroregion model in the first place (PERKMANN, 2002). At the 
same time, however, the innovation consisted mainly in developing an organisational 
form that would occupy the niche carved out by the EU INTERREG programme. In 
other words, the organisational form embodied by the EUREGIO represents an answer 
to the need of the European Commission for regional policy implementation partners 
that would be able to devise and initiate cross-border projects on a local level.  
 Therefore, like many Euroregions, the EUREGIO functions as implementation 
agency for this specific type of EU cohesion policy. The European Commission is a 
policy-maker that has no proprietary implementation apparatus and it therefore relies on 
external agents. Within this context, the “partnership principle” ensures that it can retain 
some retain some control over policy implementation. This is the context where 
organisations such as the EUREGIO can play an important role. By operating at the 
cross points between its local (horizontal) network of constituencies and the multi-level 
(vertical) network related to cohesion policy implementation, the EUREGIO’s 
organisational form has been carefully crafted to fit into this overall framework of EU 
cohesion policy. Both networks have demonstrated to be highly stable and robust over 
time but, eventually, their durability will be tested in case the INTERREG programme 
will not be renewed in its current form.  
 This symbiotic relationship between CBC bodies and EU cohesion policy 
explains why the landscape of European CBC today is dominated by EUREGIO-type 
initiatives while other models, such as the larger “Working Communities” have been far 
less successful. Equally, it is worth noting that the more ambitious attempts to devise 
cross-border regions as public-law bodies have been less successful than envisaged by 
its promoters, notably the Council of Europe. Legally speaking, as a private-law 
association, the EUREGIO is only very weakly instituted as a public body yet this does 
little to hamper its effectiveness. To a large extent, this can be attributed to the role it 
came to play in the implementation of INTERREG in its area.  
 On the third point, I discuss the question of the impact of the EUREGIO to date 
with reference to the discussion as to how CBC can be assessed in more general terms.  
The impact of CBC policies on their socio-economic environment are notoriously 
difficult to assess. As required by EU regulations, the EUREGIO has developed a series 
of metrics that it uses for assessing the immediate outcome of the Interreg-funded 
activities. For instance, the evaluation of the EUREGIO INTERREG II programme 
states that during 174 projects involving almost 800 partner organisations more than 
1,700 jobs were either directly or indirectly created or “secured”.9 Also, more than 75% 
of Interreg-funded projects are said to be continuing after INTERREG funding had run 
out. These figures have to read against the actual cost of the policy interventions which 
amounted to approx. EUR 64m, including all EU, national and local funds. This means 
a cost of more than EUR 36,000 for each maintained or created workplace was incurred. 
Whether this can be judged as a success, needs to be assessed on a comparative basis 
with similar structural policy programmes led by the EU and other policy makers and 
can therefore not be pursued further here.  
 It is even more difficult to judge the broader impact of CBC within the area 
concerned. This is because many of the intended impacts of CBC measures will be, on 
the one hand, intangible and, on the other, effective only over the medium and long 
term. One possibility is to qualitatively evaluate the achievements of EUREGIO activity 
over time. Among others, these involved creation of better public transport links across 
the border, the generation of countless social contacts via project-linked collaboration, 
efficiency gains via better cross-border access to private and public services and cross-
border labour market integration. In view of these achievements, there is no doubt that 
by promoting and funding these projects, the EUREGIO has done much to accelerate 
and deepen local cross-border integration.  
 However, any more systematic impact assessment attempts needs to be carried 
on a comparative basis across other CBC cases. To date, there has been little research 
addressing these broader questions of CBC impact. In addition, the few existing studies 
remain relatively sceptical. Even where Euroregions have existed for decades, these 
studies find that efforts to intensify cross-border economic contacts have been 
successful only to a limited degree (Geenhuizen et al., 1996). Research on the 
Euroregion Maas-Rhine, the Euregio Rhine Maas Nord as well as the Dutch-Belgian 
Euroregions indicates that the majority of inter-firm linkages are still confined by their 
                                                 
9 EU-Gemeinschaftsinitiative INTERREG-II für die EUREGIO Förderung aus dem Europäischen Fonds 
für Regionalentwicklung. EFRE Nr. 94/00/10/020 – ENDBERICHT 31.12.2001.  
 
national economic spaces (Hassink et al., 1995, Houtum 1997). Krätke (1999) provides 
similar evidence for the German-Polish border area.  
 Many observers take note of the barriers that prevent cross-border bodies from 
being effective and efficient governing units acting on behalf of cross-border units as a 
whole (that is, “cross-border regions”). Beck’s analysis suggests that the way 
Euroregions are organized, as transnational policy networks, does not constitute an 
efficacious governance mechanism to address distributive or even re-distributive issues 
(Beck 1997). He also argues that the participating actors are strongly oriented towards 
their own territorial and organizational interests. From a more policy-oriented 
perspective, it has been suggested that Euroregions are hardly a good means of co-
ordinating economic development strategies for a cross-border space (Liberda, 1996). 
This is even truer for Euroregions on the external EU border (SCOTT, 1998). Church 
and Reid (1999), students of Franco-British cross-Channel co-operation, have pointed to 
the volatile and ad-hoc character of many attempts to devise coherent cross-border 
strategies. They point out that the “lack of genuine co-operation”, mostly due to 
unilateral use of supposedly co-operative funds and proliferation of short-term funding 
coalitions, fails to induce any genuine political identity based on “cross-border 
regiones” (Church and Reid, 1999: 654).  
 Compared to the sceptical tone of these assessments, the EUREGIO fares 
relatively well. The independence the secretariat achieved versus the member 
authorities means that Interreg-funded projects in the EUREGIO are likely to be more 
“cross-border” in nature than in case where no such cross-border agency exists. The 
EUREGIO secretariat has developed a self-interest in cross-border matters that – in 
conjunction with a high level of experience and expertise – guarantee it will more likely 
represent the interests of the cross-border space as a whole rather than of single 
participating public authorities. At least procedurally, the EUREGIO can therefore be 
seen as well equipped for promoting integration with in the local cross-border space it 
occupies.  
 Concluding, the fact that the EUREGIO, like most CBRs in Europe, is highly 
dependent on EU cohesion policy support via the INTERREG programme, is both 
blessing and curse. On one hand, INTERREG and previous EU support has provided 
the opportunity for the EUREGIO to consolidate its achievements and establish an 
important role for itself within the public sector administration in the Dutch-German 
border area. On the other, the dependence on INTERREG puts significant limits on its 
discretion over priorities and activities. These limits are exemplified by the tensions 
over the policy priorities relating to INTERREG IV, the successor programme for 
INTERREG III from 2008 onwards. While the preference of the EUREGIO and its local 
members is to run a broad-based portfolio of activities across all “spheres of life”, the 
Dutch government would like to see a stronger focus on specialised technology and 
innovation measures in pursuit of the Lisbon Agenda. In this situation, it has to be 
acknowledged, the existence of the EUREGIO as an established cross-border centre of 
competence will make a difference by enhancing the bargaining power and influence of 
the local partners on the general direction of INTERREG implementation.  
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